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Unlike performance incentives for private sector managers, little is known about performance
incentives for managers in public sector bureaucracies. Through a randomized trial in rural China,
we study performance incentives rewarding school administrators for reducing student anemia—
as well as complementarity between incentives and orthogonally assigned discretionary resources.
Large (but not small) incentives and unrestricted grants both reduced anemia, but incentives were
more cost-effective. Although unrestricted grants and small incentives do not interact, grants fully
crowd-out the effect of larger incentives. Our findings suggest that performance incentives can be
effective in bureaucratic environments, but they are not complementary to discretionary resources.
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1. Introduction
The provision of public services in many developing countries is low in quality
(Banerjee, Deaton, and Duflo 2004; World Bank 2004; Das, Hammer, and Leonard
2008; Berendes et al. 2011). Although the underlying reasons are complex and
incompletely understood, the culprit is not simply lack of resources, inadequate
training, or deficiencies in provider knowledge. Supply-side incentives are also often
poorly aligned with social objectives. Absenteeism in many parts of the world is
pervasive (Chaudhury and Hammer 2004; Kremer et al. 2005; Banerjee and Duflo
2006; Chaudhury et al. 2006; Lewis 2006), and providers often fail to do in practice
what is within their knowledge and means (Das and Hammer 2004; Alcázar et al.
2006; Chaudhury et al. 2006; Das and Hammer 2007; Leonard and Masatu 2010; Das
et al. 2012; Sylvia et al. 2015).
To better align provider incentives with social objectives, performance pay has
become increasingly common in public sector service delivery (Oxman and Fretheim
2008; Eichler and Levine 2009; Miller and Babiarz 2014). Drawing on the logic of
performance pay in human resource management (Lazear 1995; Hall and Liebman
1998; Lazear 2000), this approach provides direct financial rewards for achieving
prespecified performance targets. Despite its growing prominence, however, there is
remarkably little empirical evidence on basic mechanism design considerations in the
use of performance pay to improve public service delivery (Miller and Babiarz 2014).
This paper contributes to the literature on performance pay in developing
countries—and in particular, its design—through a large-scale experiment studying
the interaction of performance incentives and unconditional block grants, both of
varying sizes, for public sector administrators. Specifically, we provide primary school
administrators (lead principals who are the managers and executive decision-makers in
schools—hereafter “administrators”) with randomly assigned budget transfers (large
and small) and randomly assigned financial incentives (large and small) for improving
the health of their students. Our health focus is anemia, a leading child health problem
in rural China.1
Our study yields four key findings. First, we find that larger incentives for anemia
reduction were effective when administrators had fewer resources at their disposal for
implementing the program. Incentives that provided substantial additional income to
administrators (mean realized payouts of about 2 months of annual salary) reduced
anemia among students who were anemic at baseline by 13.8 percentage points (or
38%). Second, in contrast, small incentives (one tenth the size of the larger incentives)
were ineffective in reducing anemia—and were significantly less effective than large
incentives. Third, even absent explicit incentives, unrestricted budget transfers to
school administrators led to sizeable reductions in anemia, suggesting other motives
among administrators to allocate resources toward student nutrition. However, the
1. Previous studies have shown anemia rates among primary school aged students in poor regions of
western China to be around 30% on average (Luo et al. 2011; Miller et al. 2012).
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resource cost of reducing anemia through larger school budgets was approximately
twice as great (per case of anemia averted) as combining larger performance incentives
with smaller budgets—implying that school administrators with explicit financial
incentives used smaller budgets with greater productive efficiency.
Finally, we find that explicit financial incentives and unrestricted grants can be
strong substitutes—and whether or not they are depends critically on incentive size.
Specifically, we find that large incentives and grants are pronounced substitutes.
The effect is particularly strong: unrestricted resource transfers (of sizes chosen by
government planners in practice) crowd-out the effect of large incentives. Importantly,
we find this pattern of results not only with student nutritional outcomes, but also with
intermediate measures of resource allocation and effort (e.g., the provision of better
nutrition and effort to persuade parents to improve their children’s diets at home).
Substitution therefore reflects reductions in administrator effort with larger budgets
(and not simply decreasing marginal returns to inputs in the biological production of
child nutrition).2
Our findings contribute to existing literature on performance incentives in several
ways. First, previous studies on the role of performance pay in the public sector
have generally focused on front-line workers rather than public sector managers (or
“bureaucrats”—an exception is Rasul and Rogger 2018).3 However, the scope of
behavioral responses among managers is potentially much broader, possibly with
greater potential for improving public sector service delivery. Specifically, rather
than simply increasing effort, the actions of managers can have greater influence
on productive and allocative efficiency because of the resources under over which
they have decision-making authority (Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa 1986; Athey and
Roberts 2001; Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul 2007; Burgess et al. 2010).
Second, existing studies of performance pay for managers generally examine
the private sector, but insights from this literature cannot be easily extrapolated to
2. One concern in this context may be multitasking–in particular, whether or not incentives to reduce
anemia led schools to focus on anemia reduction at the expense of teaching. In a separate analysis of
multitasking effects, we find no evidence that these incentives led to a reduction in student test scores on
standardized Math and Chinese exams designed by the research team based on the national curriculum
and designed to have good psychometric properties. However, we do find some evidence of multitasking
on margins of teaching where the costs to administrators and teachers of diverting effort are lower (i.e.,
tasks that would likely be the first source of diverted effort). For example, in “secondary subjects” (subjects
other than math or Chinese, which are not a focus of high school entrance exams and hence given less
weight in the curriculum) we find evidence of diverted effort when children were taught these subjects by
a homeroom teacher (who was often given responsibilities related to the anemia program).
3. Several recent studies have examined performance pay provided as personal income to front line
workers in the health and education sectors, including Lavy (2002, 2009), Glewwe et al. (2010),
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011), Duflo et al. (2012), Ashraf et al. (2014), and Behrman et al.
(2015). Other recent studies have focused on incentives to institutions paid as budget revenue. These
include Bloom et al. (2006), Basinga et al. (2011), Gertler and Vermeersch (2012), Olken, Onishi, and
Wong (2014), and Yip et al. (2014). Behrman et al. (2015) also study incentives for school administrators,
but bundled with incentives to students and teachers.
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bureaucracies.4 Career concerns can be particularly strong in bureaucracies—and they
may overpower or interact with incentives created by performance pay (Gibbons
and Murphy 1992). Moreover, civil servants may be considerably more prosocially
or intrinsically motivated (Francois 2000; Francois and Vlassopoulos 2008; Tonin
and Vlassopoulos 2015)—and performance pay may dampen the effects of these
motivations (see Fehr and Falk 2002; Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel 2011; Kamenica
2012 for reviews). Finally, public sector production processes tend to be both more
complex (due to multiple objectives and multiple agents—Dixit (2002)) and more
heterogeneous (due to a primary goal being to expand access, which necessitates
operation in a wider range of contexts than private sector organizations that have more
scope to select the markets in which they operate). Performance pay may therefore
be ineffective if rewards are not well-aligned with effective inputs across the range of
contexts within which an organization operates.
Third, we contribute to existing literature by studying three mechanism design
considerations of performance pay. One is that we reward outputs directly. In contrast
to rewarding inputs, performance incentives for outputs strengthens incentives for
managers to draw on local information and contextual knowledge to improve both
allocative and productive efficiency—or to “innovate.” Our study is one of the
first focused on health to reward health outputs—and we do indeed find evidence
of managerial innovation (school administrators successfully work with parents to
improve diets at home).5 Another is that we directly study differential behavioral
responses to performance incentives of varying sizes. Existing literature on this issue
is split: a number of studies outside of organizational settings report large responses
to very modest rewards (as well as highly elastic demand at prices close to zero),6
whereas others suggest small responses—or even reductions in effort (e.g. when
intrinsic motivation is crowded-out).7 Our results are more closely aligned with the
latter.8 Finally, we provide first evidence on how incentives interact with the amount of
resources under contracted agents’ control. A common focus is on the relative effects of
4. On performance pay for corporate executives and private sector managers in developed countries,
see Jensen and Murphy (1990), Hall and Liebman (1998), Murphy (1999), Hall and Murphy (2003),
and Oyer and Schaefer (2005). Bandiera et al. (2007) and Bloom et al. (2013) study these virtues of
performance pay for private sector managers in developing countries. Burgess et al. (2010) study a team-
based incentive scheme in the context of a government agency in the United Kingdom; although the scheme
was not explicitly targeted to managers, the authors find that the team-based incentive induced managers
to reallocate more efficient workers to incentivized tasks.
5. The two exceptions of which we are aware are Singh (2015) and Miller et al. (2012). Though not
studying the health impacts of incentives tied to health outcomes, Leonard (2003) studies traditional healers’
use of outcome-contingent contracts in Cameroun. In the education sector, performance pay rewarding
good test scores is more common (Lavy 2009; Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011; Behrman et al.
2015).
6. Kremer and Miguel (2007), Thornton (2008), Banerjee et al. (2010), Cohen and Dupas (2010), Karlan,
List, and Shafir (2011), Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson (2011).
7. See Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel (2011) for several examples.
8. We also note at least two key differences with this previous literature: one is that receiving incentive
payments in our study required sustained behavior change (reducing iron deficiency anemia requires several
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incentive and resource-based approaches (see Lavy 2002; Hanushek 2006); however,
these two approaches are often implemented simultaneously and are likely to interact
in important ways. Theoretically, incentives and resources available to managers can
be complements or substitutes. We study this issue both theoretically and empirically,
find evidence of strong substitution when incentives and budgets are large.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a conceptual
framework for understanding school administrators’ behavioral responses to output-
based performance incentives. Section 3 provides background on school-based
nutrition programs as well as the causes and consequences of anemia. Section 4
describes our experimental design, data collection, and methods. Section 5 reports our
results, and Section 6 concludes.
2. Conceptual Framework
In this section, we propose a simple model of the school administrator decision problem
that we study. Specifically, we consider the influence of both output-based performance
incentives and discretionary resources on organizational effort—as well as how they
interact (i.e., if they are substitutes or complements). We model the school administrator
(bureaucrat) as choosing effort e to reduce anemia in the school.9 Additionally, the
school administrator also decides on the allocation of resources—in particular, how
to divide the school budget G between anemia reduction A and other school functions
G  A. The health production function f(e, A) combines the school administrator’s
effort e and the funds allocated to reducing anemia A in determining student health H.
The school administrator’s maximization problem is therefore
max
e;A
w C H  v .e/ C S .G  A/ (1)
subj: toW w D tH C m; (2)
H D f .e; A/ ; (3)
G  A (4)
Total take-home pay w includes both base pay m and a reward or bonus for
improving student health, tH, which is the product of t, the marginal bonus, and H, the
net gain in student health (in our case, the net reduction in the number of students with
anemia). Disutility of effort, v(e), is also strictly increasing but convex: v0 > 0, v00  0.
The parameter  , which is non-negative, allows the school administrator to be altruistic,
deriving direct utility from student health (prosociality and public service motivation
months of dietary chance), and another is that because all school administrators receive information about
anemia, the presence of incentives may not alter its salience as much (Benhassine et al. 2015).
9. See Rogger (2014) and Nath (2015) for other models of bureaucratic behavior with choices of effort.
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are often considered important among public sector workers—e.g., see Besley and
Ghatak 2007; Dal Bó, Finan, and Rossi 2013). The school administrator also derives
utility from school functions unrelated to health, S(G  A), which is also assumed
to be increasing (S0 > 0) and concave (S0  0). We make standard assumptions that
the health production function, f(e, A), is increasing in both arguments and concave
(fe > 0, fee < 0, fA > 0, fAA < 0, fee fAA  feA  0) and the intuitive assumption that
feA  0, or that the marginal productivity of one input is nondecreasing in the level of
the other input.




. C t / f .e; A/  v .e/ C S .G  A/ : (5)
The first order conditions are
Ue  . C t / fe .e; A/  v0 .e/ D 0; (6)
UA  . C t / fA .e; A/  S 0 .G  A/ D 0: (7)
The first order condition (6) implies that the optimal level of effort equates the
marginal benefit of increasing effort (the increase in health, fe(e, A), multiplied by
t C  , reflecting both the increase in take-home pay and the altruistic increase in
direct utility) with its marginal cost. Equivalently, the first order condition (7) implies
that resources G are invested in activities unrelated to nutrition up to the point that its
marginal benefit, S0(G  A), equals the marginal benefit of investing in nutrition-related
activities, ( C t)fA(e, A).
The second order conditions required for a maximum are
Uee  . C t / fee .e; A/  v00 < 0; (8)
UAA  . C t / fAA .e; A/ C S 00 < 0; (9)
jH j  UeeUAA  U 2eA > 0; where UeA  . C t / feA: (10)
2.1. Comparative Statics
We analyze how the school administrator’s choice of effort and resources dedicated to
nutrition changes both with incentives t and discretionary resources G—both separately
and in combination (as we study empirically through our experiment). First, we
consider each effect separately; the corresponding first order comparative statics (see





. C t / fAA C S 00
 C . C t / fAfeA





. C t / fee C v00
 C . C t / fefeA
jH j > 0; (12)
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de
dG
D  . C t / feAS
00





. C t / fee  v00

S 00
jH j > 0: (14)
Intuitively, an increase in the incentive rate t leads to an increase in both effort and
the amount of resources dedicated to nutrition (11–12). Notably, these increases are
greater when feA is larger. Naturally, the larger that feA is, the larger is the marginal
productivity of either e or A when the other input increases, accentuating the effect of
increasing the incentive rate.
An increase in discretionary resources also raises both effort and resources devoted
to nutrition (13–14). Note in (13) that if the marginal productivity of effort were
independent of the level of A—that is, if feA D 0, then changes in discretionary
resources would not influence effort. This is not a general property, but rather a result
of our simplifying assumption that v(e) and S(G  A) are additive in the utility function,
so e and A only interact through the production function.
An important result is also that 0 < dA/dG < 1. This means that an increase in G
translates into a positive but smaller increase in A, implying that the full increase in
G is not entirely allocated to A, but rather a share is invested in non-nutritional
activities. This is clear from (7): if G and A increased by the same amount, then the
term S0(G  A) would not change—and hence could not be equal to ( C t)fA(e, A).



















To understand the conditions under which incentives and resources are complements
or substitutes, we must compute the cross-partial derivatives of e, A, and H with
respect to t and G. Note that because the first order comparative statics (11–14)
depend on the second derivatives of v(e), S(G  A), and f(e, A), the cross-
partial derivatives will necessarily depend on the third order derivatives of v(e),
S(G  A), and f(e, A). In order to gain insight, we make the simplifying assumption that
the third order derivatives of the production function are null (i.e., that the production
function is quadratic) while leaving v000 and S000 unrestricted.10
Using the chain rule on H D f(e, A), the cross-partial derivative of H with respect











































solution would be very cumbersome if we did not assume that these are zero.
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which could be positive (implying that t and G are complements) or negative (implying
that they are substitutes) because the first term in brackets is negative, the second term
is positive (and its size crucially depends on feA), and the third and fourth could be
positive or negative (as shown in Online Appendix B, which provides expressions for
de=dtdG and dA=dtdG). Because the sign of dH=dtdG cannot be determined a
priori, we discuss in what follows how its sign depends on the sign and size of key
derivatives: S000, v000, feA.
A key determinant of dH=dtdG is feA, how much the productivity of effort
increases when A increases. A larger feA favors complementarity between t and G
(dH=dtdG > 0). Intuitively, larger values of G imply larger values of A, leading to
effort being more productive (feA > 0), and hence a larger response to the incentive.
11
Mathematically, feA multiplies the second term in (17), which is positive, and also
enters into the formulae for de/dtdG and dA/dtdG.
The third derivative of v(e), v000, defines whether the marginal cost of effort, v0, is
convex (v000> 0) or concave (v000< 0). A convex (concave) marginal cost of effort favor
substitution (complementarity). To understand the intuition, assume that the marginal









Gh  Gl ; G
h > Gl : (18)
Note that de=dG > 0, so effort is greater for Gh than for Gl. Moreover, the concavity
of the marginal cost of effort implies that, at higher levels of effort, the marginal cost
of effort increases at a lower rate. Hence, the marginal cost of effort increases at a
lower rate at Gh than at Gl. Hence, the response of effort to an increase in incentives,
de(G, t)/dt, that is, the terms in the numerator of (18), might be larger for Gh than Gl
because the increase in the marginal cost of effort will be smaller.
A similar argument can be made to explain why S000 > 0 is conducive to
complementarity. Ultimately, both e and A are inputs in the health production function,
but v(e) is increasing in e whereas S(G  A) is decreasing in A. This explains why if
v000< 0 favors complementarity, S000> 0 also does.12
The flexibility of the model means that our predictions depend on three key
parameters. Having discussed the effect of each of them individually, Table 1
summarizes the necessary and sufficient conditions that the model provides.
11. Note that if S000< 0, the term S000f
eA
, which is part of de/dtdG (see the Online Appendix), can partially
offset this effect.
12. Note that if one assumed a simple power function such as S(G  A) D (G  A)ˇ , the condition that
S00 < 0, would also imply necessarily that S000> 0. However, this would not be the case for other functional
forms, such as a cubic polynomial.
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TABLE 1. Summary of necessary and sufficient conditions implied by the model.
S000  0, and v000  0, and feA D 0 imply that dHdtdG < 0
S000 > 0, or v000 < 0, or feA > 0 are necessary conditions for dHdtdG > 0
3. Background
3.1. School-Based Nutrition Programs
School-based interventions are believed to be among the most cost-effective
approaches for delivering health and nutrition services to children in developing
countries (Bundy and Guyatt 1996; Jukes, Drake, and Bundy 2008; Orazem, Glewwe,
and Patrinos 2008). Because schools are natural points of contact with school-aged
children, they may provide a platform from which health and nutrition interventions can
be delivered at relatively low cost (Bundy and Guyatt 1996; Bundy et al. 2006; Jukes,
Drake, and Bundy 2008). Because of this, school-based health, nutrition and feeding
programs are a ubiquitously central function of schools, particularly in developing
countries.
In China, schools have the legal responsibility to promote the health of their
students (Education Law of the Peoples Republic of China, 1995). Although school
administrators are evaluated as part of the cadre evaluation system (ganbu kaohe
zhidu)—a system for evaluating public officials and servants in China (Whiting
2004)—measures of child health are not typically included as criteria for evaluation.
3.2. The Causes and Consequences of Anemia
Our study examines school-based programs to reduce anemia. Anemia is estimated
to affect nearly one quarter of all school-aged children worldwide (World Health
Organization 2001). Although there are many causes of anemia (including a variety of
genetic disorders and infections as well as nutritional deficiencies), iron deficiency
accounts for about 50% of cases globally (Balarajan et al. 2011; Pasricha et al.
2013)13—and 85%–95% of cases in China (Du et al. 2000).
The consequences of iron deficiency—with or without anemia—can be substantial,
particularly for children at critical stages of development. A large literature links
iron deficiency to fatigue and reduced work capacity among adolescents and adults,
impaired cognition and cognitive development among children, and reduced immune
response for all age groups (Thomas et al. 2006; World Health Organization 2001; Yip
2001; Balarajan et al. 2011). School-aged children with anemia (the focus of our study)
13. There is some debate in the public health literature on the proportion of the anemia burden attributable
to iron deficiency (Balarajan et al. 2011). Intestinal worms are unlikely to be a major cause of anemia in
our study areas as the prevalence of hookworm (the parasite most commonly associated with anemia) is
low (Xu et al. 1995).
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have also been shown to have inferior educational outcomes (grades, attendance, and
school attainment—Taras 2005; Nokes, van den Bosch, and Bundy 1998).
3.3. Biomedical Strategies for Reducing Anemia
Increasing iron consumption can effectively prevent iron deficiency anemia.
Worldwide, fortifying staple foods with iron has historically been an effective approach
to addressing micronutrient deficiencies (Allen et al. 2006). Fortification is an attractive
strategy because it requires little behavior change and because it can be implemented
on a large scale. However, fortification of staple foods may be ineffective in areas like
Northwest China in which households grow and consume their own food (Allen et al.
2006).
An alternative approach is to increase the consumption of naturally iron-rich foods
and those that promote iron absorption during digestion. Animal sources (including
red meats, fish, and poultry) provide heme iron, which is more easily absorbed during
digestion; plant sources (including green, leafy vegetables) provide nonheme iron,
which is less readily absorbed—but can be promoted by consumption of vitamin C
(and inhibited by consumption of milk and other calcium-rich products).
Finally, a third approach is the delivery of micronutrient supplements (e.g.,
vitamins) containing iron. To be effective, however, regular consumption over several
few months is necessary—and so inadequate compliance may render supplementation




To draw our study sample, we began with all 36 counties officially designated by the
Chinese government as “poverty counties” in five regions (prefectures) in western
China (Haidong in Qinghai Province, Dingxi, Tianshui, and Longnan in Gansu
Province, and Ankang in Shaanxi Province—see Figure 1). In August 2011, we
conducted a canvass survey in each county to construct a list of all rural primary
schools and the number of students enrolled in each. Restricting our sampling frame
to primary schools with 150–300 students total,15 we randomly selected 170 of 1410
14. Previous trials addressing iron deficiency and anemia have suffered from low levels of compliance
or attempted to preempt compliance problems. Bobonis et al. (2006), for example, instructed preschool
teachers to provide children with iron therapy for 30 days following health camps but found that only
around 18 days were actually administered. The WISE study in Indonesia (Thomas et al. 2006) hired
facilitators to regularly visit participants and remind them to take their supplements.
15. A lower bound of 150 students was chosen to ensure that the number of samples students per school
was enough to meet power requirements. 300 was chosen as the upper bound to keep the project within
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FIGURE 1. Study regions.
eligible schools for inclusion in our study (and limited our selection to one school per
township16). Our sample size was based on power calculations conducted using data
from primary schools in the same region of China (Miller et al. 2012).17
Within study schools, we randomly sampled 50 fourth and fifth grade students
from each school. In China, fourth and fifth grade students are typically 10–11 years
old, and we chose these grades to select students whom we considered sufficiently old
to provide meaningful survey responses—but also sufficiently young to be generally
prepubescent (given the independent effect of menarche on hemoglobin concentration).
budget. These bounds are on reported school sizes; actual numbers of students are often significantly less
than reported. Note that 39.9% of rural primary schools in the sampling frame (all rural primary schools
in project counties) were reported to be within this range.
16. Local administration of schools is generally done at the school district level, which is below the
township. Contamination due to two school administrators meeting at events organized at higher levels,
for example, was thus unlikely.
17. Using data from Miller et al. (2012), we performed Monte Carlo simulations to conduct power
calculations for students who were anemic at the time of that study’s baseline survey. The intraclass
correlation was estimated adjusting for covariates (baseline hemoglobin concentration, the number of
students in each school, whether schools had a kitchen, student–teacher ratio, distance to the furthest
village served by the school, percent boarding students, and county dummies), which we also specified as
covariates in the current study’s preanalysis plan.
176 Journal of the European Economic Association
We also conducted physical exams and collected data from students from other grades
at baseline to obfuscate our focus on fourth and fifth graders.
4.2. Data Collection
We conducted our baseline survey in September 2011 and our follow-up survey in May
2012 (at the beginning and end of the 2011–2012 academic year), collecting detailed
information on students, households, school administrators, and schools.
Student Surveys. We interviewed all sampled students at their school, collecting
information on student background, health behaviors related to anemia, school
activities, and general health. To collect information on school and home feeding
practices, students were also given standard food frequency questionnaires to record
information about food consumption at school and at home over the past week.18
We also measured student blood hemoglobin (Hb) concentration at the time of
the student survey. Nurses from the Medical School of Xi’an Jiaotong University
accompanied study enumerators, collecting finger-prick blood samples to analyze on-
site (at schools) using HemoCue Hb 201C assessment systems.
Household Surveys. For each sampled student, we also collected information on
students’ households using forms completed by parents.19 Specifically, these surveys
collected information about interactions between parents and the school, household
income and assets, health-related expenditures, expenditures on food and information
on other household members, focusing on household characteristics that students
would be unlikely to know themselves.
School Administrator Surveys. We interviewed school administrators (bureaucrats)
at three different points in time: before and after school administrators were told about
the incentive contract and block grant to which they were assigned and again at endline.
At baseline, school administrators provided information about their background, job
history, salary, and compensation as well as perceptions of professional responsibilities
and anemia knowledge. Using scales adapted from Grant (2008), we also measured
the intrinsic and prosocial motivation of administrators. Following their participation
in the training session on anemia (conducted 3 weeks after the baseline survey)
18. Information on food consumption was collected using a seven-day recall “food frequency
questionnaires” (FFQs) completed by students as part of the endline survey. These questionnaires asked
children the number of times they had eaten each of 33 food items in the past seven days, separately for
school and home. Food frequency questionnaires (FFQs) have long been used in nutrition research and
have been recommended for use in large surveys of children given low cost and low respondent burden
(McPherson et al. 2000; Magarey et al. 2011). FFQ responses by children about their own consumption
has been shown to be more accurate than the responses of their parents (Burrows et al. 2013).
19. For budgetary reasons, household surveys were given to students to take home and return. As a result,
household forms are missing for approximately 20% of students. All possible information on students and
households was collected with the student survey, which was administered by enumerators.
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300 Schools 













A1. Small Block 
Grant
(32 Schools)
A2. Large Block 
Grant
(33 Schools)
B1. Small Block 
Grant
(20 Schools)
B2. Large Block 
Grant
(20 Schools)
C1. Small Block 
Grant
(33 Schools)
C2. Large Block 
Grant
(32 Schools)
FIGURE 2. Experimental design.
administrators were given a second short survey to measure their understanding of
the training material.
School Surveys. Finally, we collected basic information from schools (about
enrollment, staffing, facilities, finances, and meal provision) and teachers (about
teacher characteristics, communication with parents, and teaching practices).
4.3. Experimental Design
We designed our study as a cluster-randomized trial using a 3  2 crosscutting design
(Figure 2). After conducting our baseline survey, we provided all school administrators
with information about anemia (which included presentations and a video presentation
by a Chinese nutrition specialist, see script in Online Appendix C), and schools were
randomly assigned one of six experimental cells (see Figure 3 for the study timeline).
The first three paths of Figure 2 show randomly-assigned incentive groups: a group
without incentives (group A), a “small” incentive group (group B), and a “large”
incentive group (group C). Across these arms are two orthogonally assigned block
grant groups: a “small” block grant group (group 1) and a “large” block grant group
(group 2). The reference group in our six-cell design is the default policy (education
about anemia coupled with a modest resource transfer and no incentives, group A1).20
20. Thus, all schools in the experiment received a small or large grant. This was done to ensure that all
schools had access to resources that could be devoted to anemia reduction. In a previous study, we find that
educating school administrators on anemia (including the same information as in the current study) alone,
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Installment and 
Supplements (if ordered)
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School Administrators Contacted 
to Confirm Second Grant and 
Supplement Installment
FIGURE 3. Data collection and intervention timeline.
To improve power, we used a stratified randomization procedure. Specifically, using
joint quintiles of the baseline distribution of school-level hemoglobin concentration
and combined standardized math and Chinese exam scores—yielding 25 strata, we
randomized cell assignment within each stratum. Stratification improves power by
ensuring balance on these covariates between experimental groups. Our analysis
takes this randomization procedure into account, conditioning on stratum fixed effects
(Bruhn and McKenzie 2009).
Incentives for Anemia Reduction. In the large incentive arm (65 schools, group C in
Figure 2), we offered school administrators financial incentives to be paid as private
income according to the net reduction in number of students identified as anemic




125 RMB  Nb  Ne if Nb  Ne > 0
0 otherwise
;
where Nb is the number of students found to be anemic at baseline and Ne is the number
of who were anemic at the time of the endline survey.21 Based on an earlier study (Miller
without incentives or grants, had no detectable impact on anemia rates (Miller et al. 2012). Our reference
group also mimics how a recent Chinese school nutrition program (costing 16 billion yuan per year) was
designed. Under the program, local education bureaus and schools receive 3 yuan per day per student (4
yuan for boarding students) to provide nutritious meals. How exactly the program is implemented and
monitored varies widely across localities.
21. We measured anemia using a sample of 50 fourth and fifth graders and calculated the implied
number of anemic children in the school using the prevalence rate in our sample. Although administrators
could possibly discern which students were tested at baseline (although testing was done before contract
assignment), they were later told explicitly that another sample of students would be drawn at the end of the
school year. Moreover, unreported analyses show that teachers were unable to correctly name or identify
anemic students at endline.
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et al. 2012), the contract increment (125 yuan (RMB), or about $19.4022) per student
reduction was chosen to provide roughly two months of a school administrator’s annual
salary for a feasible reduction in anemia given previous studies (a reduction of about
50%).23 Actual payouts for school administrators with the large incentive and small
block were ultimately 3,303 yuan (or about $516)—approximately two month’s base
pay for school administrators in this region. We did not reveal the identity of students
who were anemic at baseline to administrators (and when we asked teachers to identify
students who were anemic at endline, they were unable to do so).24
The small incentive arm (40 schools, group B in Figure 2) was identical to the large
incentive arm except that the magnitude of the incremental incentive was ten times
smaller (12.5 RMB, or about $1.95 per student reduction in anemia between baseline
and follow-up in our sample). This magnitude of this incentive provides roughly 0.2
additional months of annual salary for the same feasible reduction in anemia given
previous studies.
At the time that school administrators signed incentive contracts, they were told the
(implied) number of anemic students in their schools (the identity of anemic children
was not revealed).25 Contracts were written using official letterhead of the Chinese
Academy of Sciences (a government agency) and counter-signed by the deputy director
of the implementing research center (school administrators signed two copies of the
contract, one of which they kept). Note that all interventions were implemented in
partnership with local education bureaus, signifying to school administrators that the
project was sanctioned by local governments.
Block Grants. The small block grant (group 1 in Figure 2) was 0.3 RMB ($0.05)
per student per day (85 schools), which we calculated to be adequate for school
administrators to purchase vitamins for each student to take daily. The large block
grant (group 2 in Figure 2) was 0.7 RMB ($0.11) per student per day (85 schools). In
total, small block grant schools received 7,452 yuan ($1164) on average and large block
grant schools received 17,388 yuan ($2717). These grants were given to schools in two
installments, once at the beginning of the program and another approximately half way
22. We use a conversion rate of $1 D 6.4 RMB, the approximate exchange rate at the time of the baseline
survey (September 2011).
23. There are presumably superior contract structures, but optimal contract design requires substantial
information not available to us, including information about the cost of provider effort, the productivity
of provider effort, and the utility functions of both providers and the contracting “principal” (Laffont and
Tirole 1993; Salanié 2005). Simple, easily understandable contracts may also appear more transparent to
school administrators and promote credibility.
24. We did reveal the identity of students who were severely anemic (with hemoglobin concentration
below 80 g/L) as these students required immediate medical attention. There were 3 such students found
at baseline.
25. Note that administrators in all study cells were provided the same information about the number of
anemic children in their respective schools.








































Small Block Grant Large Block Grant
Foodstuff Iron Supplements/Fortified Soy, Flour
Communication/
Transfers to Households Non−nutrition
FIGURE 4. Reported use of block grants by category. Figure shows mean values of reported use of
block grants by experimental group from the endline survey. Expenditure amounts are per student.
through the school year.26 Although funds were given in the context of the nutrition
program roll-out, administrators were explicitly told that they were free to allocate
these at their discretion to other school functions benefitting students—whether this
be for educational goods, health specific goods, or general school supplies.27 Indeed,
Figure 4 shows that administrators used a substantial share of their grants for activities
unrelated to nutrition.
Health Education. Because knowledge about anemia in our study areas was poor,
prior to revealing treatment assignment, we provided health education about nutrition
26. After explaining block grant assignment to administrators, we asked them to complete a nonbinding
budget plan for how they intended to use the block grant. Our study team emphasized that this plan was
nonbinding, but this plan would be used to coordinate orders for iron supplements to be delivered to
schools. This was necessary because the market for supplements in rural areas is limited. Administrators
were free to change their supplement orders at any time. Administrators had no reason to believe that
second installments were conditional on performance—they were given an explicit time frame and told an
explicit amount for the second installment.
27. Note that although these transfers were not large compared to total school expenditures, they do
represent a significant increase in budgetary autonomy for school administrators as the bulk of school
expenditures are earmarked for specified uses at higher levels of administration. Although administrators
often have discretion over small expenditures, larger expenses require approval from upper levels.
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and anemia to all school administrators in our study (see Online Appendix C).
Our health education materials were based on published, peer-reviewed studies and
specifically included information about: (1) the prevalence and causes of anemia,
(2) the consequences of anemia (including its effect on cognitive development and
academic performance), and (3) efficacious nutritional approaches to reduce anemia
(increasing dietary intake of iron-rich foods, nutritional supplementation with iron
fortified soy and flour or with supplements, etc.).
4.4. Balance and Attrition
Summary statistics and tests for balance across study arms are shown in Table 2.28
Panel A shows student level characteristics (N D 2051), panel B shows characteristics
of schools (N D 167), and panel C shows characteristics of school administrators (N
D 167).29 The first two columns of the table give the mean and standard deviation of
each variable in the comparison (small block grant, no incentive) group. Columns (3)–
(7) show coefficients on treatment variables and interactions estimated using equation
(19), controlling only for randomization strata fixed effects. The final column shows
the p-value from a test that the coefficients are jointly zero for each characteristic.
Only 4 of the 75 tests are significant at the 10% level, and a test for joint equality is
rejected at the 10% level for only one characteristic (the number of times meat was
consumed in the past week). Joint tests for all 15 characteristics reveal no significant
differences.30
The overall attrition rate between baseline and endline surveys was 6.2% in our
sample of children anemic at baseline (5% for the full sample). Defining attrition as a
missing hemoglobin measurement at endline for students with a baseline measurement,
Online Appendix Table A.2 shows that there were no meaningful differences in attrition
across treatment groups (columns (1) and (2)). Analyzing the correlates of a missing
household survey at endline conditional on a child not dropping out, Online Appendix
Table A.2 also shows that neither the treatment indicators nor other covariates are
significantly correlated with a missing household survey form.
28. This table shows summary statistics and tests balance for our main analysis sample of students
initially anemic at baseline. Summary statistics and balance tests for the full sample are given in Online
Appendix Table A.1.
29. Although 170 schools were included in the study, no students were found to be anemic in 3 schools
at baseline. No schools refused participation in the study. The baseline anemia rate (defined as Hb
< 120 g/L) in the full sample was 24%. Online Appendix Table A.11 shows transitions in and out of
anemia status in the comparison (small grant only) group.
30. These tests were conducted by regressing treatment status on all 15 baseline covariates and testing
that the coefficients were jointly zero. The smallest p-value from these F-tests was 0.29.
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4.5. Empirical Strategy
Given random assignment of schools to treatment cells shown in Figure 2, comparisons
of outcome variable means across treatment groups provide unbiased estimates of the
effect of each experimental treatment. However, to increase power (and to account
for our stratified randomization procedure), we condition our estimates on a set
of covariates used in power calculations. With few exceptions, all of the analyses
presented (including outcome variables, regression specifications, and hypotheses
tested) were prespecified in a preanalysis plan written and filed before endline data
were available for analysis.31 In reporting results in what follows, we explicitly note
analyses that deviate from the preanalysis plan.
As specified in advance, we use ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression to estimate
the effect of cell assignment on child-level outcomes with the following specification:
Yi;j D ˛ C ˇ1SIj C ˇ2LIj C ˇ3LGj C ˇ4.SIj /  .LGj /
C ˇ5.LIj /  .LGj / C X
0
i;j  C "i;j ; (19)
where Yi, j is the outcome for child i in school j; SIj is a dummy that equals 1 if the
administrator in school j was assigned to receive a small incentive contract and 0
otherwise; LIj is equal to 1 if the administrator in school j was assigned to receive a
large anemia reduction incentive contract; LGj is equal to 1 if the school received a
large block grant; Xi, j is a vector of child controls (age, class-year, and gender, and
baseline value of the outcome variable), school controls (number of students, student-
teacher ratio, whether the school has a kitchen, proportion of boarding students, and
distance to the farthest village in the school’s catchment area); and dummy variables
for counties and randomization strata. We adjusted our standard errors for clustering
at the school level using Liang–Zeger clustered standard errors.
In addition to estimating effects on our two primary outcomes (hemoglobin
concentration and a dichotomous indicator for anemia status), we use the same
specification to estimate effects on secondary outcomes to examine the behavioral
mechanisms underlying changes in primary outcomes. For these secondary outcomes,
we focus our analysis on summary indices constructed using groups of closely-related
outcome variables (as we specified in advance). To construct these indices, we used
the GLS weighting procedure described by Anderson (2008). For each individual, we
constructed a variable Nsij as the weighted average of k normalized outcome variables
in group (yijk). The weight placed on each outcome variable is the sum of its row
















31. This analysis plan was filed with the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab at http://www.
povertyactionlab.org/Hypothesis-Registry.
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where 1 is a column vector of 1 s, dPj 1 is the inverted covariance matrix, and yij is
a column vector of all outcomes for individual i in group j. In addition to reducing the
number of tests required, this weighting procedure can improve efficiency by placing
less weight on outcomes that are highly correlated and more weight on those less
correlated. The summary index variable can also be created for individuals with a subset
of missing outcomes (these outcomes simply receive less weight in the construction
of the index). Although we emphasize these indices in our discussion, we also report
estimates for each individual index component in Online Appendix Tables A.5–A.8.
A note on correcting for multiple comparisons is also warranted. For our primary
estimates, we test eight null hypotheses: five for treatment main effects and their
interactions (shown in equation (19)) and three additional ones—that the small and
large incentives have the same average effect (ˇ1 D ˇ2), that the large incentive and the
large block grant have the same average effect (ˇ2 D ˇ3), and that the average effect
of the large incentive in presence of a large grant is zero (ˇ2 C ˇ5 D 0).32 We therefore
adjust our p-values to control the family wise error rate (FWER), or the probability of
at least one Type I error. Specifically, we use the free step-down resampling method
of Westfall and Young (1993). This procedure accounts for the dependency of the
data, and is therefore more powerful than procedures that do not (e.g. a Bonferroni
correction ). For secondary outcomes, we adjust our p-values according to the total
number of tests within a family of outcomes (the number of outcomes in the family
times five—the number of treatment coefficients in each regression).
5. Results: Childhood Anemia and Underlying Behavioral Responses
In this section, we first present results obtained by estimating equation (19) for
anemia status and hemoglobin concentration, and in Section 5.2, we then investigate
the underlying behavioral responses that may have produced them. Following our
preanalysis plan, we emphasize estimates from our sub-sample of children who were
anemic at baseline. In the Online Appendix Tables we report results for the full sample
of children receiving hemoglobin tests (Online Appendix Tables A.3, A.4, A.6, and
A.8).
5.1. Childhood Anemia
The first five rows of Table 3 report estimates for each treatment and their interactions
(and the seventh row reports comparison group means for the no incentive, small grant
group at endline). For each estimate, we report the regression coefficient, the standard
32. We did not prespecify the last of these (whether or not the joint effect of the large grant and large






186 Journal of the European Economic Association
TABLE 3. Impacts of school administrator anemia reduction incentives and block grant size on student hemoglobin
concentration and anemia prevalence.
Anemic at endline
(Hb < 120 g/L)
Hemoglobin
concentration (g/L)
Dependent variable (1) (2)
Panel A: Impacts relative to comparison (no incentive, small grant) group
(1) ˇ
1




























(6) Observations 1923 1923
(7) Mean in no incentive, small grant group 0.364 129.901





: effect of large incentive versus effect of







: effect of large incentive given small











Notes: Table uses sample of children testing anemic at baseline. Children are considered anemic if they have
an altitude-adjusted hemoglobin concentration below 120 g/L (per WHO guidelines). Rows (1)–(5) in panel A
show estimated coefficients for treatment group indicators and interactions obtained by estimating equation (19)
(controlling for baseline hemoglobin concentration, student age, student grade, student sex, number of students in
the school, whether the school has a canteen, student teacher ratio, distance to the furthest village served, percent
of boarding students, whether the school has implemented the “Free Lunch” policy, county dummy variables,
and dummy variables for randomization strata). Standard errors are shown in parentheses, unadjusted p-values
are shown in square brackets and p-values adjusted for multiple inference are shown in curly brackets. Adjusted
p-values were constructed using the free step-down resampling method of Westfall and Young (1993) with 10,000
iterations. Panel B shows unadjusted and adjusted p values from tests of linear combinations of coefficients in
panel A. Significant at 10%; significant at 5%; significant at 1% based on adjusted p values.
error and corresponding p-value, and the p-value adjusted for multiple hypotheses
testing.33
RESULT 1. (Large Incentives). First, we find that the large incentive significantly
reduced the probability of anemia at endline in schools receiving a small grant.
Specifically, the large incentive was associated with a 14 percentage point reduction
33. Table 3 reports results for students found to be anemic at baseline as pre-specified. Appendix Table 3
shows main results for the full sample.
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in anemia (Table 3, row 2, column (1); unadjusted p-value D 0.001, adjusted p-value
D 0.064), implying a 37.9% reduction relative to the comparison group (small grant,
no incentive schools) at endline. The corresponding increase in hemoglobin was about
2.6 g/L (Table 3, row 2, column (2); unadjusted p-value D 0.015, adjusted p-value D
0.285). These empirical findings agree with our model’s prediction derived in equations
(11) and (12).
Because our incentives rewarded anemia reduction (and not hemoglobin levels per
se) and anemia status reflects shifts in the distribution of altitude adjusted hemoglobin
concentrations across the 120 g/L threshold, Figure 5a plots the distribution of endline
hemoglobin concentrations (adjusted for covariates included in equation (19)) by
study arm among children who were anemic at baseline. The distribution for the large
incentive group is shifted to the right of the control group distribution (Kolmogorov–
Smirov test p-value D 0.02). This relative shift in mass is greater in the left tail of
the distribution, implying that the large incentive reduced the share of children falling
below the anemia threshold.
RESULT 2. (Small Incentives). Second, in contrast, the small incentive had no
detectable effect on the probability of anemia at endline (Table 3, row 1, column (1)).
Comparing the estimates for small and large incentives (ˇ1 D ˇ2 in equation (19)),
we also reject the null hypothesis that the two estimates are equal (Table 3, row 8,
column (1); adjusted p-value D 0.089). Taken together, the estimates for the small and
large incentives suggest that the price effect of incentives is meaningful independent of
information conveyed by the presence of an incentive contract (Gneezy and Rustichini
2000). Figure 5a shows that the shift in the hemoglobin distribution for the small
incentive arm relative to the control group arm is smaller—particularly in the left tail
of the distribution.
An important question in the literature on financial incentives is whether or not
they crowd-out intrinsic or prosocial motivation (Deci and Ryan 1985; Gneezy and
Rustichini 2000; Fehr and Falk 2002; Francois and Vlassopoulos 2008; Gneezy, Meier,
and Rey-Biel 2011; Kamenica 2012). We find that the effects of the small incentive
on anemia was significantly more positive amongst school administrators who score
higher at baseline on a prosociality scale (adapted from Grant 2008) (Online Appendix
Table A.10, row 1, columns (1)–(3); adjusted p-value D 0.038). We also find a similar
effect for intrinsic motivation (also adapted from Grant 2008), but the difference in
effects is not statistically significant (Online Appendix Table A.10, row 4, columns
(1)–(3); adjusted p-value D 0.570). However, the effect of the large incentive is not
heterogeneous by prosocial or intrinsic motivation (the coefficients are close to zero and
not statistically significant), implying that if monetary incentives are large, crowding-
out of prosocial motivation may be overcome by extrinsic motivation provided by
incentives.
RESULT 3. (Large Block Grants). Third, in the absence of any explicit incentive,
the large block grant alone reduced the probability of student anemia at endline
(an unambiguous prediction of our model, as equations (13), (14), and (16) show).
Specifically, Table 3 (column (1), row 3) shows that the large block grant was associated
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FIGURE 5. Distributions of hemoglobin concentration. (a) and (b) plot the distributions of student
level hemoglobin concentrations (in g/L) at endline across incentive treatment groups separately by
small and large block grant groups. Endline Hb concentrations are adjusted for prespecified baseline
control variables. Kolmogrov–Smirnov p values for small anemia incentive versus no incentive are
in 0.93 panel (a) and 0.12 in panel (b). For large anemia versus no incentive these are in 0.02 panel
(a) and 0.24 in panel (b).
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with a 14.5 percentage point reduction in anemia (adjusted p-value D 0.047), implying
a 39.8% reduction relative to the comparison group at endline. This reduction is very
similar to the effect of the large incentive (0.145 vs. 0.138), but the average increase
in hemoglobin concentration is larger (4.205 vs. 2.567), although not statistically so
(Table 3, row 9, column (2); adjusted p-value D 0.597).
RESULT 4. (Interactions between Incentives and Grants). Whether or not incentives
and unrestricted grants are complements or substitutes is an empirical issue. The model
in Section 2 makes clear that both complements or substitutes are possible depending on
cross partial derivatives of the hemoglobin production function as well as the curvature
of the marginal cost of effort and the marginal utility that the school administrator
obtains from non-nutritional activities. We do not find evidence of complementarity—
and notably, incentives and block grants can be strong substitutes if the incentives are
sufficiently large.
Table 3 shows that the interaction between the large incentive and the large block
grant (ˇ5 in equation (19); Table 3, column (1), row 5) is positive and statistically
significant (adjusted p-value D 0.072). Moreover, the magnitude of substitution implies
that the large incentive and the large block grant fully crowd each other out: the
marginal effect of the large incentive given the large block grant in column (1) (ˇ2 C
ˇ5 D 0.058) is not statistically different from zero (adjusted p-value D 0.65) for the
probability of anemia.34 Although this point estimate is positive, we are not able to
rule out a negative effect of the large incentive given a large block grant on anemia as
predicted by equation (15) of the model in Section 2. Adding coefficients, the estimated
total effect of the large incentive and large grant on anemia is 0.087 (adjusted p-value:
0.177).
Given decreasing marginal returns to inputs in the reduction of anemia, a natural
question arising from these results is if substitution between incentives and resources
is due to (i) the biological relationship between inputs and anemia (i.e., although more
inputs are used, there is no effect on anemia because of biological constraints) or
(ii) conscious decisions by administrators. Our results for input use in Section 5.2
are consistent with the latter interpretation (we find direct evidence of substitution
in input use). (We also note that efficacy trials of iron supplementation suggest that
much larger reductions in anemia are biologically possible (Gera et al. 2007).) Given
that we find similar results for input use in the full sample (Online Appendix Table
A.4), differences in the effects of incentives and resources on anemia rates between
the sample of children anemic at baseline (Table 3) and the full sample (Online
Appendix Table A.3) are likely explained by decreasing marginal returns to inputs in











D 0.051, adjusted p-value 0.742).
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5.2. Behavioral Responses Underlying Changes in Anemia
We next examine the underlying behavioral responses to our interventions that
may have produced the changes in anemia described in Section 5.1. To do so, we
focus on actions taken by administrators and subsequent responses among students
and their parents—specifically, student consumption of iron-rich foods, direct iron
supplementation, communication between parents and schools about anemia and
its nutritional basis. For each family of outcome variables, we examine indices as
described in Section 4.5.
Behavioral Responses Underlying Result 1: Large Incentives. We first consider the
behavioral responses underlying Result 1—that in the presence of the small block
grant, the large incentive significantly reduced the probability of student anemia.
The results in Table 4 suggest that the large incentive led administrators to increase
vitamin supplementation and the provision of iron-rich foods (column (1), row 2;
adjusted p-value 0.105). This increase in iron-rich foods seems driven largely by home
consumption (row 2, column (5), adjusted p-value 0.090).35
An interesting issue is if the increase is vitamin supplementation and provision
of iron-rich foods occurred because school administrators with large incentives spent
the block grant differently—or instead because they exerted more effort. As Figure
4 shows, reported use of block grants for different types of nutrition interventions
(vitamins, food, fortification), and other uses is similar for incentive and nonincentives
schools receiving a small grant, suggesting that greater anemia reduction due to
incentives is driven by effort rather than differential allocation of the block grant.
In exploring how administrators were able to increase child consumption of iron
rich foods at home, we examine contact with parents. Row 2, column (8) of Table 4
reports a positive (but insignificant) increase in contact. However, Online Appendix
Table A.7 shows that estimates for several components of this index appear meaningful
and important, albeit insignificant at conventional levels using adjusted p-values
(largely because of the large number of hypotheses being tested (11  5 D 55).36
These results are suggestive that the large incentive led administrators to engage more
regularly with households—specifically about nutrition and anemia—which in turn
appears to have improved children’s diets at home.
35. Subindices for supplements and food (including separate indices for food at home and school) were
not explicitly specified in the preanalysis plan. Online Appendix Table A.9 reproduces Table 4, including
additional tests of linear combinations of coefficients estimated using equation (19). These additional tests
were not prespecified.
36. Specifically, the number of individual meetings between administrators and households over the past
semester increased by 0.52 (column (2), row 2)—an increase of 59%; whether or not schools contacted
parents about nutrition in the past semester rose by 12 percentage points (column (3), row 2)—an increase
of 29%; and whether or not schools contacted parents about feeding children iron-rich foods rich in the
past semester rose by 10 percentage points (column (4), row 2)—an increase of 47%. Note that the number
of school-wide parent meetings and number of individual meetings with parents were not prespecified to
be part of this index.
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The finding that administrators responded to large incentives by engaging with
households is important for at least two related reasons. First, it demonstrates
innovation and the use of local knowledge in response to performance incentives
that reward outputs (health outcomes) as opposed to those that rigidly reward the use
of prespecified inputs (such as vitamin consumption at school), as most performance
incentives in the health sector do (Miller and Singer Babiarz 2014). Second, for
outcomes jointly produced with beneficiary households (like good child nutrition), it
demonstrates the potential of performance incentives that reward outputs to minimize
offsetting compensatory behavior among beneficiaries (e.g. a common finding among
studies of school lunch programs, ) (Jacoby 2002; Leonard 2003; Kazianga et al.
2009; Das et al. 2013).37
Behavioral Responses Underlying Result 2: Small Incentives. Second, we study
the behavioral responses underlying Result 2—that the small incentive did not
reduce anemia prevalence. Table 4 (column (1)) shows that administrators with small
incentives did not significantly increase the provision of supplements or food (row 1,
columns (1)–(3)), nor did they increase their contact with households (column (8))
(Online Appendix Table A.7, row 1 also shows that none of the individual components
of this index are statistically significant (even using unadjusted p-values).
Behavioral Responses Underlying Result 3: Large Block Grants. Third, we examine
behavioral responses to large block grants, which reduced the prevalence of student
anemia. The large block grant significantly increased the provision of supplements and
food (Table 4, row 3, column (1); adjusted p-value 0.004). This increase appears due to
increases in both iron supplements (column (2), adjusted p-value 0.051) and iron-rich
food (column (3), adjusted p-value 0.092).
Interestingly, the large block grant may have also increased school contact with
parents—suggesting that administrators worked through households to reduce anemia
without any explicit incentives to do so. Although the estimate for the index in Table 4
is not statistically significant (row 3, column (8)), some estimates for index components
are larger than those for incentives. This may reflect intrinsic or prosocial motivation—
or a sense of obligation or organizational mission (Ashraf, Bandiera, and Jack 2014).
Furthermore, although the large block grant increased communication with households,
the impact of block grants on food consumption at home is insignificant. We speculate
that this could reflect less effort (relative to administrators with incentives) devoted to
mitigating compensatory behavior by households in response to greater food provision
at school (which seems to have increased, although not significantly, with large grants).
37. We speculate that the bureaucratic environment is one reason that administrators chose to work
through households. Administrators may have viewed this strategy as a way to reduce anemia (and
increase rewards) while avoiding the risk of career harm due to possible adverse events. This career harm
may also be more severe under incentives if incentives altered perceptions of administrators’ motivation for
reducing anemia (analogous to how incentives may crowd-out effort if they alter the motives for prosocial
tasks perceived by others—Bénabou and Tirole (2006)).
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Behavioral Responses Underlying Result 4: Substitution between Large Incentives and
Large Block Grants. Finally, with the combination of large incentives and large block
grants, we find direct evidence of crowding-out of inputs consistent with our anemia
estimates in Table 3. Specifically, Table 4 shows that for vitamin supplementation
and consumption of iron-rich foods (both at school and at home), estimates for the
interaction between the large incentive and large block grant are negative, implying
substitution (row 5). The interaction between the small incentive and large grant is
also negative, but smaller in magnitude and only marginally significant. Overall, there
is no evidence that resources and incentives are complements—and that at sufficiently
high levels, they are substitutes.38
5.3. Comparative Cost-Effectiveness
Finally, we examine the comparative cost-effectiveness of each of our intervention
combinations. In doing so, we consider both the subsample of children anemic
at baseline and our full sample of children, and we present both “programmatic”
cost-effectiveness (direct monetary program costs to the implementing organization)
and social cost-effectiveness calculations. We calculate total social costs as the sum
of: (a) programmatic costs; (b) the cost of public funds; and (c) costs incurred by
households in responding to the interventions. From social costs we exclude incentive
payments (apart from their contribution the cost of public funds), considering these
payments to be transfers (Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton 2009). Incentive payments
may also not be considered a cost, but rather simply another way of allocating salary
expenditures (Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011). Note that although we only
consider comparative cost-effectiveness in reducing anemia prevalence (the primary
outcome of the study), it is possible that the treatments, particularly the block grant, do
produce other benefits not considered here. Moreover, if the sole purpose of transfers to
schools is to reduce anemia, there may be more cost-effective options than unrestricted
block grants. Our goal is not to conduct a full cost-benefit analysis, but rather to
compare strategies for reducing anemia. Although we find no intervention effects on
standardized exam scores, even these (together with anemia measures) may fail to fully
capture intervention benefits.
Table 5 presents these results.39 The key finding that we highlight is that although
large block grants were as effective in reducing student anemia as large incentives, they
were more expensive. First, considering full social costs and using the full sample,
the relative cost per case of anemia averted was 1,453 yuan (about $227) in the
large incentive/small block grant group—but 44% larger in the large block grant group
38. Given our experimental design, we are unable to rule out the possibility of complementarity at lower
levels of resources.
39. See table notes for further details about these calculations.
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TABLE 5. Comparative cost effectiveness calculations.


















(1) Block grant 0.0 0.0 48.0 48.0 48.0
(2) Incentive payments 1.1 15.7 0.0 1.4 17.5
Cost of public funds
(3) Cost of public funds 0.3 4.7 14.4 14.8 19.7
Costs to households
(4) Full sample 45.5 60.7 90.8 38.3 62.7
(5) Anemic sample 34.6 95.0 147.5 26.6 49.4
Total costs
(6) Programmatic 1.1 15.7 48.0 49.4 65.5
(7) Social—full sample 45.8 65.4 153.2 101.1 130.3
(8) Social—anemic
sample
34.9 99.7 209.9 89.5 117.0
Panel B: Anemia reduction (percentage point reduction)
(9) Full sample 0.028 0.045 0.073 0.074 0.032
(10) Anemic sample 0.012 0.138 0.145 0.199 0.087
Panel C: Cost effectiveness (cost of averting one anemia case)
Full sample
(11) Programmatic N.S. 349.6 657.5 668.1 2047.4
(12) Social N.S. 1452.7 2098.6 1366.1 4072.4
Anemic sample
(13) Programmatic N.S. 114.0 331.0 248.4 753.1
(14) Social N.S. 722.5 1447.3 449.6 1345.1
Notes: All costs in renminbi per child (exchange rate as of September 2012 was 6.3 USD/RMB). Costs of the
information intervention and anemia testing are excluded as these are constant across treatments. The cost of
the information intervention was 1,020 yuan per school and the cost of anemia testing was 6.7 yuan per child.
Additional administrative costs are assumed to be negligible as administration of block grants could be built into
the administration of other school finances, administrative costs of rewards into administration of existing school
administrator evaluation policies and policies, and monitoring of anemia into existing policies stipulating annual
checkups for school children. In the absence of good estimates for China (and other developing countries), the
cost of public funds is assumed to be 0.3 based on estimates for the United States (Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley,
1985). Social costs include costs incurred by households and exclude incentive payments (except the deadweight
loss to taxation) considering them a transfer. Costs to households include costs of purchasing additional food
and additional time spent attending parent meetings. Estimates for additional food costs are based on estimates
for impact on meat, vegetable, and fruit consumption at home reported in Online Appendix Tables A.5 and A.6.
Reported increases in times foods were consumed in the past week are assumed to be constant across all 24 weeks
of the program. Serving sizes are assumed to be half of the recommended daily consumption (25 g of meat, 150 g
of vegetables, and 100 g of fruit). Food prices are based on prices in local markets as reported by the school
accountant at baseline. Time spent in parent meetings is based on estimates in Online Appendix Tables A.7 and
A.8. One meeting is assumed to have an opportunity cost of 60 yuan (approximately half of local daily wages).
Anemia reduction estimates in panel B are calculated from estimates in Table 2 and Online Appendix Table A.3.
Effects not significant (N.S.) for the small block grant, no incentives intervention.
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(2,099 yuan, or about $328).40 Second, the cost-effectiveness of these two interventions
relative to each other is similar when we restrict our calculations to children anemic at
baseline (as we do in Sections 4 and 5, following our preanalysis plan). Specifically,
the large incentive/small block grant intervention is approximately 50% more cost
effective than large block grant intervention without incentives (723 yuan, or $113,
per case of anemia averted vs. 1,447 yuan, or $226). Finally, considering calculating
only programmatic costs and using children anemic at baseline, the cost-effectiveness
of the large incentive/small block grant intervention is roughly one third of that of the
large block grant (114 yuan, or about $18 vs. 331 yuan, or about $52).
6. Conclusion
This paper provides new evidence on how public sector managers respond to the
provision of performance incentives. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first study
to analyze how behavioral responses to performance pay interact with exogenously
assigned levels of resources—a critical issue in the design of incentive systems under
stringent resource constraints (as is common in many developing countries).
We report four key findings. First, when school administrators have fewer budgetary
resources available to them, large performance incentives (with realized payments
equivalent to a couple of months of annual salary) lead to substantial improvement in
service delivery. This seems driven by greater effort rather than changes in budgetary
resource allocation. In particular, we find evidence that school administrators were
able to innovate, working through their students’ parents to alter nutritional practices
at home. Second, smaller incentives (one tenth the size of the larger ones) were
ineffective on average and had negative effects on prosocially motivated administrators.
Third, even absent explicit performance incentives, increasing school administrators’
budgets led to important improvements in performance (but was considerably less
cost-effective than using performance incentives), implying the presence of other
motives—potentially including intrinsic ones—in our context.
Fourth, we find that performance incentives and unrestricted grants are substitutes
in the production of health when incentives are large. The degree of substitution is
substantial: at the policy-relevant levels that we study, increasing the size of unrestricted
block grants completely crowds out the effect of incentives (and vice versa). This is
an important result for resource-poor environments in which both budgetary resources
and performance incentives are used simultaneously as policy levers for improving the
quality of public service delivery.
There are of course limitations to this study. One is that, as with all empirical
studies, our results are not generalizable to settings beyond our study context. However,
40. These estimates exclude administrative costs of the incentive scheme (assuming these would be rolled
into existing policies as noted in the notes to Table 5). When the costs incurred for anemia testing (6.7 RMB
per child in a sample of 50 children per school annually) are included in costs of the incentive scheme, the
large incentive/small block grant remains more socially cost-effective than the large block grant at 1,848
yuan per case averted.
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school-based nutrition programs like the one we study are nearly ubiquitous in low-
and middle-income countries (Del Rosso and Marek 1996; Mũkoma and Flisher 2004;
Bundy et al. 2006; Orazem et al. 2008). Because a large share of children attend school
in most countries, school-based programs are widely considered to be among the most
cost-effective means of delivering child health interventions (Orazem et al. 2008). We
believe that our study provides behavioral insights relevant in a variety of settings in
which managers have budgetary discretion—and increasingly also face high powered
incentives. Another is that our study estimates short-run intervention effects. Longer-
run effects may differ, particularly as administrators learn more about the relationships
among their effort, various inputs, and anemia reduction. Finally, although we find
that incentives for school administrators to reduce student anemia were effective, we
also note features that may make our setting conducive to the use of performance
incentives. One is that the rewarded outcome (anemia reduction) can be measured
objectively and reliably. Relative to other settings, frontline workers (teachers in our
setting) in China may also be relatively responsive to instruction from administrators,
which might alleviate problems of moral hazard in teams that could be more prevalent
elsewhere.
Overall, among public sector administrators in rural China, we find evidence
that appropriately designed performance incentives (sufficiently large, and absent
substantial discretionary resources) can improve public sector service delivery—
and ultimately, child outcomes. Despite the bureaucratic environment, our study
suggests that performance pay can be an effective approach to motivating public
sector managers.
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